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INTRODUCTION

This Article will focus upon how the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has, over the past decade, addressed certain key issues in the area of employment discrimination.' Critical cases will be reviewed through the prism of the authors' belief that, consistent with congressional intent and public
policy,2 the federal courts of appeals should be wary of setting legal

standards that act as barriers to employment discrimination litigants who seek relief in the federal courts.
The federal judiciary has only had responsibility for meaningful enforcement of antidiscrimination laws for the last quarter century, after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "1964
law").3 Some states, of course, had outlawed various types of dis* A.B. 1958, Harvard College; LL.B. 1963, New York Law School. Mr. Steel has represented plaintiffs in civil rights actions for more than 25 years, including some of the cases
mentioned in this Article. He is a member of the firm of Steel Bellman & Ritz, P.C.
** A.B. 1980, Harvard College; J.D. 1984, New York University Law School. Ms. Clark
is an associate with the firm of Steel Bellman & Ritz, P.C.
I The discussion in this Article will be largely limited to race, sex and national origin
discrimination actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), although decisions interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the fair housing laws will be discussed where their
holdings may be applicable to Title VII and § 1981 actions.
2 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974) (holding agreement
to arbitrate cannot foreclose federal civil rights suit, based on strong public policy favoring
bringing of civil rights suits in federal court).
I Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000d-4, 2000e to 2000h-6 (1988)). The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch.
31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982), contained broad language
prohibiting race discrimination, but "lay partially dormant for many years." Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968). In Jones, the Supreme Court held for the first time
that 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which was derived from § 1 of the 1866 Act, barred all racial discrimination, public and private, in the sale or rental of property. Id. at 413. In Johnson v. Rail-
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crimination long before passage of the 1964 law. For example, New
York State has had a law prohibiting racial discrimination on the.
books since 1945, but it was rarely enforced before 1968. 4 Additionally, after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,5 the southern federal judiciary had been presented with
antidiscrimination litigation involving public entities, but few, if
any, suits of this nature had been pursued in the north prior to
passage of the 1964 law.
In that year, Congress reacted to years of upheaval during
which African-Americans, with greater and greater insistence, demanded racial equality. Title VII of the 1964 law ("Title VII") prohibited discrimination based upon race, color, religion, and sex in
the workplace.6 On paper, this law seems to be designed to change
the United States from an overtly discriminatory society to one in
which important decisions affecting individual lives would be made
on merit rather than on the basis of race, national origin, or sex.
This new law prohibiting discrimination, however, was intrinsically weak. For example, it did not criminalize any of the offending conduct. Moreover, under Title VII employers could not be
held liable for punitive damages and for damage awards to compensate victims of discrimination for pain, suffering, and humiliation.7 In short, while the language of this new law was written in
broad strokes, the penalties for violations were circumscribed.8 In
way Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975), and Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
168-75 (1976), the Supreme Court held that § 1981, which was also derived from § 1 of the
1866 Act, applied to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts for employment and public accommodations.
4 See Ch. 118, § 1, [1945] N.Y. Laws (codified as amended at N.Y. Exac. LAW § 290
(McKinney 1982)); see also Doe v. Roe, Inc., 143 Misc.2d 156, 158, 539 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989) (noting "paucity of decisional law" on issue of whether New
York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination based on alcohol and drug abuse), aff'd,
160 A.D. 2d 255, 553 N.Y.S. 2d 364 (1st Dep't 1990); Rudow v. New York City Comm'n on
Human Rights, 123 Misc.2d 709, 714, 474 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1009 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984)
("It]here has been a paucity of state judicial opinions on sexual harassment"); cf. Sager,
FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212, 1213 (1978) (arguing "that we should treat... 'underenforced' constitutional norms as
valid to their conceptual limits").
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). The prohibition of sex discrimination was originally included in an attempt to defeat the bill. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
244 n.9 (1989).
" Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 581 (2d Cir. 1989).
' Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (enforcement provisions of Title VII include
injunctions, appropriate affirmative action, equitable relief, and accrual of back pay) with 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (treble damages under Clayton Act for violation of antitrust laws) and 18
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addition, Title VII contains a very short statute of limitations9 and
sets forth complex administrative and procedural mechanisms that
may act as pitfalls for the unwary pro se plaintiff. Moreover, even
though Title VII set up a government agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which was given investigative powers, and authorized the Department of Justice to institute civil actions attacking pattern and practice violations,
widespread enforcement was dependent upon the willingness of
private individuals to obtain legal representation and challenge
discriminatory conduct. 10
It should go without saying that individual litigants and attorneys willing to represent them will only come forward in sufficient
numbers to have a significant impact upon discriminatory practices
if they receive a reasonable welcome from the courts that are given
the responsibility of adjudicating their claims. Of course, the welcome (or unwelcome) mat that the federal judiciary lays out for
civil rights plaintiffs is, to a huge extent, contingent upon crucial
interpretations concerning the reach of the civil rights laws by the
United States Supreme Court. However, the federal courts of appeals have much to say about the all-important ground rules of
civil rights litigation, since they are called upon to interpret Supreme Court precedent and to decide fundamental questions in the
absence of Supreme Court precedent.
This Article will address the way the Second Circuit has handled key issues in this area and the effects the Second Circuit's
philosophy has had on civil rights plaintiffs and the development
of civil rights law.
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) (treble damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act).
' See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988). Plaintiffs must file a Title VII claim within 90 days
after an administrative determination by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"). Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Peete v. American Standard Graphic, 885 F.2d 331, 331 (6th
Cir. 1989). They have 240 days to file a charge with the EEOC. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447
U.S. 807, 815 n.16 (1980) ("complainant in a deferral State having a fair employment practices agency over one year old" must file charge within 240 days of alleged discriminatory
employment practice to preserve Title VII rights).
10 The law was changed in 1972 to allow the EEOC to bring civil actions on behalf of
individuals. However, primary enforcement of the law was still left to individuals bringing
civil actions in federal court. See Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 676 F.2d 877, 886 n.14 (2d Cir.
1981) (finding no basis for diminishing private right of action and noting EEOC "cannot
possibly seek preliminary relief on behalf of all the complainants it believes deserving" because of "volume of its work"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988).
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PROCEDURAL IMPEDIMENTS

The complex statutory scheme of Title VII has created difficult procedural issues since its inception, involving the various limitations periods imposed by the statute, the federal courts, and the
agencies, the interplay between administrative and judicial remedies, and the relationship between state and federal civil rights
laws. This Article will examine two discrete areas that have caused
controversy in the last decade.
A.

Timeliness

The mandatory administrative filing requirement under Title
VII, coupled with the fact that a claimant has only ninety days
after receipt of a "right to sue letter" to bring a federal action,""
often acts as a stumbling block for the employment discrimination
litigant, especially when the procedure, as is often the case, is begun by a claimant acting pro se.' 2 During the 1970's, the courts of
appeals, including the Second Circuit, grappled with the question
of whether the requirement of timely filing charges with the EEOC
was jurisdictional or analogous to a statute of limitations, which
could be tolled in some circumstances. The Second Circuit, in
some cases, held that failure to file timely EEOC charges was a
jurisdictional bar to filing a federal action. 3 In other cases, the
Second Circuit acknowledged that the time period was more akin
to a statute of limitations and therefore could be tolled under some
extremely limited circumstances.' 4 The court, however, repeatedly
declined to follow Dart v. Shell Oil Co.,' 5 in which the Tenth Cir-

cuit had concluded that the EEOC filing period could be tolled
where the claimant was not represented by counsel.
After the Supreme Court held in Zipes v. Trans World AirSee supra note 9 (statute of limitations imposed by Title VII).
These short time periods often do not afford individual prospective plaintiffs, especially those with limited resources, sufficient time to locate counsel. Many civil rights cases
are thus begun and litigated to a conclusion by pro se plaintiffs.
13 See, e.g., Goss v. Revlon, Inc., 548 F.2d 405, 406 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
968 (1977).
4 See, e.g., Keyse v. California Texas Oil Corp., 590 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (tolling
improper because plaintiff was represented by counsel during 210-day period); Smith v.
American President Lines, 571 F.2d 102, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1978)("in certain situations tolling
of the Title VII time limits might be acceptable" but such instances are "very restricted").
The Fifth Circuit had come to a similar conclusion in Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 1975).
" 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977).
"

12
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lines1 6 that the EEOC filing period was not jurisdictional, the Second Circuit stiR tended to view narrowly the circumstances under
which tolling was appropriate. The Second Circuit suggested in
Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp.17 that the statute of
limitations might be tolled in a situation in which an EEOC official
gave a potential claimant misinformation concerning the statute of
limitations and the claimant signed an affidavit to that effect."' In
Miller v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,19 the Second Circuit held that the claimant must have been "actively misled" or "prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his
rights. ' 20 The court defined "extraordinary" as a situation in which
it would have been "impossible for a reasonably prudent person to
'2
learn that his [or her] discharge was discriminatory." 1
There have been individual situations, however, in which fundamental fairness tipped so heavily in favor of the employee that
the Second Circuit did hold that the statute of limitations was
tolled. For example, in Tolliver v. County of Sullivan,2 2 the court
held that it would be unfair to bar the complaint of a pro se litigant because of a delay in filing by the pro se clerk of the court.2 3
The Second Circuit has also adopted a key procedural rule
that makes it easier for employees to join pending employment discrimination suits. In Snell v. Suffolk County,24 the court held that
where one plaintiff has filed a timely EEOC charge, other plaintiffs
may later join in the action, even if they did not file EEOC
charges, as long as the later claims arose out of similarly discriminatory treatment in the same time frame.25 The Snell ruling
16455 U.S. 385 (1982).
1" 731 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1984).
18 Id. at 146. The plaintiff in Johnson failed to prove that the EEOC advised him of the
filing deadline. Id.
19 755 F.2d 20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851 (1985).
20

Id. at 24.

21

Id. By contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the time period did not begin to run until

the relevant facts "were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff." Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 1975).
22 841 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1988).
23 Id. at 42.
24 782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986).
25 Id. at 1101. By reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit followed the Eighth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits and a panel of the Fifth Circuit. See Ezell v. Mobile Housing
Bd., 709 F.2d 1376, 1380-81 (11th Cir. 1983); Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1323-24 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Wheeler v. American Home Prods. Corp., 563 F.2d 1233, 1239 (5th Cir. 1977);
Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 554 F.2d 876, 882-83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
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(which results in no unfairness to the employer since the subsequent claims are related to the first claim) is an excellent example
of judicial sensitivity to the special role of civil rights plaintiffs acting as private attorneys general. It also facilitates the bringing of
class actions because it allows for the addition of named plaintiffs
to serve in representative capacities.
B. Preclusive Effect
Decisions

of Prior Judicial and Administrative

The question of whether decisions of state courts, arbitrators,
and state and federal agencies should preclude federal civil rights
actions has long troubled the federal courts and civil rights plaintiffs.26 It is clear from the legislative history of Title VII that the
purpose of the requirement that an employee first file a federal or
state administrative claim 27 before proceeding to federal court is to
encourage conciliation of employment discrimination suits. At the
same time, the administrative filing stage allows persons unrepresented by counsel to raise civil rights claims in an inexpensive and
relatively informal administrative setting. Nothing in the legislative history of Title VII suggests that Congress intended negative
decisions by the EEOC or state agencies to foreclose employees
from bringing their claims to court. 28 Such a result would eviscerate the policy behind Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.:29 that federal civil rights actions should be decided primarily by federal
courts.3 0 Moreover, it would result in preclusion of the claims of
many unwary plaintiffs, especially those proceeding pro se, who file
claims with administrative agencies without understanding the
891 (1977). But see Hodge v. McLean Trucking Co., 607 F.2d 1118, 1121 (5th Cir. 1979);
Inda v. United Airlines, 565 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978);
Schulte v. New York, 533 F. Supp. 31, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
26 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (holding that

agreement to arbitrate could not foreclose federal civil rights suit). But see Gihner v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1650 (1991) (holding that a claim under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 "can be subjected to compulsory arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application").
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1988).
28 See University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 795-96 (1986) ("Congress intended to
accord federal employees the same right to a trial de novo [following administrative proceedings] as is enjoyed by private sector employees"); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) ("absence of a Commission finding of reasonable cause cannot bar
suit under ... Title VII").
28 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
30 Id. at 59-60.
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possible preclusive effect of the agency decisions.
When a negative determination of a civil rights claim by a
state agency is affirmed by a state court, the question becomes
more complicated. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts are required to give state court judgments "full faith and credit," so long
as the plaintiff had an opportunity to "fully and fairly litigate" the
issue in the prior state court action.3 1
The question of when an employment discrimination plaintiff
has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim prior
to filing a federal action was addressed by the Second Circuit in
the early cases of Mitchell v. NationalBroadcastingCo. 3 2 and Sinicropi v. Nassau County.33 In Mitchell, an employee brought an
Article 7& proceeding appealing a negative decision of the New
York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR"). The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the
agency's decision. The Second Circuit held that the former employee was barred on principles of res judicata from maintaining
4
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against her former employer. 3
Two years later, in Sinicropi, the Second Circuit held that a Title
VII action was barred where the plaintiff had unsuccessfully appealed a negative finding by the NYSDHR to the State Human
Rights Appeal Board and then to the Appellate Division of the
New York State Supreme Court (leave to appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals was denied).3 5
The issue reached the United States Supreme Court in
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.s6 The Second Circuit decision in that case followed Sinicropi and gave preclusive effect to
-" Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980). The Court held that "[t]here is ... no
reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an
unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court simply because

the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he would rather not have been engaged at all."
Id. at 104 (footnote omitted).
553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977).
601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979).
Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 277.

35 Every other circuit that considered the issue, however, decided such cases in favor of
plaintiffs, and refused to give preclusive effect to negative state agency and/or state court
decisions. See Aleem v. General Felt Indus., 661 F.2d 135, 136-37 (9th Cir. 1981); Unger v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S. 1002 (1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1102 (1983); Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333, 334-36 (3d Cir.

1980); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1082-85 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
36 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
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an Appellate Division decision affirming a dismissal by the
NYSDHR.37 The United States Supreme Court affirmed.3 8
After Kremer, the Second Circuit continued to analyze a variety of state court and agency decisions to determine whether they
should be given preclusive effect. For example, in Bottini v. Sadore
Management Corp.,39 the court refused to give preclusive effect to
a New York Supreme Court decision upholding an arbitration
award because, under state law, the supreme court's scope of review of an arbitrator's decision was very narrow, so the employee
had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state
court.40 The Bottini court also refused to give preclusive effect to
an unreviewed administrative decision of the NYSDHR, to the
award of an arbitrator, and to a determination in a holdover proceeding in landlord-tenant court.4 1 Similarly, in Hill v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 42 the court declined to give preclusive effect to a negative determination by an administrative law judge with regard to
unemployment insurance, which was affirmed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board and by the Appellate Division pursuant to an Article 78 proceeding. 43 The Second Circuit found that
the administrative procedure and subsequent Article 78 appeal did
not give the employee the full and fair opportunity to litigate required by Kremer.4 4
The United States Supreme Court clarified matters somewhat
in University of Tennessee v. Elliot,48 holding that it would be
contrary to public policy to allow unreviewed administrative
11See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 788 (2d Cir. 1980), afl'd, 456
U.S. 461 (1982).
" Six years later, Kremer was unsuccessfully challenged on the ground that the Court
had misread New York
Peekskill, 828 F.2d 104,
39 764 F.2d 116 (2d
"0 Id. at 120-21.
4 Id.
at 120-22.
42 786 F.2d 550 (2d
"

Id.

state law on claim and issue preclusion. See Kirkland v. City of
107-10 (2d Cir. 1987).
Cir. 1985).

Cir. 1986).

at 552-53. Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. Id. at

552.
" The Second Circuit's unwillingness to apply harshly the Kremer result is illustrated
by its decision in Evans v. Syracuse City School Dist., 704 F.2d 44, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1983). In
Evans, the New York State Appellate Division, Fourth Department, dismissed plaintiff's
appeal from a State Division of Human Rights Appeal Board decision in 1979. Id. at 46. The
defendant waited until 1982 to move for summary judgment based on the res judicata defense. Id. The court held that the three-year delay was prejudicial to the plaintiff and refused to allow the defendant's motion. Id. at 47.
45 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
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agency decisions to preclude federal actions under Title VII. 46
However, the Court did allow agency determinations to be given
preclusive effect in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983. 47 This distinction was based on the public policy supporting
the passage of Title VII and Title VII's unique procedural
mechanisms.4 8
The Second Circuit made a disturbing move toward narrowing
4 9 In
access to federal court in Bray v. New York Life Insurance.
Bray, as in previous cases, the plaintiff had received an unfavorable finding from the NYSDHR.50 However, the New York Supreme
Court never reached the merits of her complaint, which was rejected as untimely.5 1 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit held that
Bray's Title VII action was precluded because, under New York
law, dismissal of an action on statute of limitations grounds is considered a judgment on the merits.52 The Bray court distinguished
Elliot on the ground that Elliot involved a state agency determina53
tion which no one ever attempted to appeal to the state court.
However, the Bray court ignored the strong language in Elliot concerning the public policy of Title VII, relying instead solely on its
54
interpretation of state law.
The complexity of the law in this area complicates strategic
decisions even for the experienced civil rights attorney. Unfortunately, many civil rights cases (including Bray55 and Sinicropi) are
Id. at 795-96.
Id. at 796-99.
Id. at 795-99. The following year, the Second Circuit followed Elliot in DeCinto v.
Westchester County Medical Center, 821 F.2d 111, 114-16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
965 (1987).
49 851 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988).
48

47
8

50 Id. at 61.

Id. at 61-62.
52

Id. at 64.

Id. at 63.
See id. The court's most recent consideration of this issue was in Solimino v. Astoria
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 901 F.2d 1148, 1149-54 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991).
In Solimino, a plaintiff alleging age discrimination received a no probable cause finding
from the NYSDHR, which was affirmed by the State Human Rights Appeal Board. Id. at
1149. Plaintiff then attempted to bring a federal action under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 1991). Id. at 1150.
The Second Circuit, analyzing Elliot, had to decide whether an ADEA action was more like
an action brought under Title VII or an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or § 1983. Id.
The court reviewed the public policy behind ADEA, id. at 1150-54, and concluded that an
ADEA action should not be precluded by an unreviewed state agency determination. Id. at
1154.
" Bray received court-appointed counsel while the state court application was pending.
14
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begun by pro se plaintiffs who have no idea of the ramifications of
their decisions to pursue claims in a particular administrative or
judicial process. 6 Often, by the time the plaintiff retains counsel,
the damage has been done. The trend toward granting preclusive
effect to decisions not made on the merits or under unequal circumstances serves only to erode the once strong public policy
favoring access to federal courts for the resolution of civil rights
claims.

II. CLASS ACTIONS
Persons suffering from discrimination in the workplace often
wish to sue not only because they want their employers to stop
discriminating against them personally and want to be compensated for what they have suffered as a result of the discrimination,
but also because they seek to end discrimination in the workplace
as a whole. Experienced civil rights lawyers will immediately analyze such cases as potential class actions. If the prospective plaintiff is part of a large enough group of similarly situated applicants
or employees and outlines allegations that are not idiosyncratic,
the class action approach may appear appropriate to the civil
rights attorney.
The lawyer probes the prospective plaintiff to make sure he or
she understands the following basic facts about employment discrimination class actions: they take much longer to resolve than
individual cases; companies often offer more resistance to them
than to individual suits; they often get more publicity than individual cases; and settlements are subjected to judicial scrutiny at
fairness hearings at which other employees or applicants may complain that the proposed settlements are unprincipled or unfair.
Often, such honesty convinces a prospective plaintiff not to become a class champion.
When a prospective plaintiff, after reflection, asks the civil
rights lawyer to bring the case as a class action, the prospective
plaintiff often does the public a great service. By putting into issue
the overall policies or practices of an employer, that plaintiff tests
the challenged practices in a way that could eliminate or validate
Bray, 851 F.2d at 64.
"I Holmes, Workers Find It Tough Going Filing Lawsuits Over Job Bias, N.Y. Times,
July 24, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (discussing difficulty in finding lawyers to take employment discrimination cases).
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them. Moreover, class action decisions or settlements affecting one
company often affect the policies and practices of other companies
in the same field, since corporate counsel look very carefully at
both decisions and settlements in the field. From a public policy
point of view, these results are often far better than those achieved
by individual suits, which frequently end in settlements that are
hidden from the public by confidentiality orders. These individual
resolutions have almost no effect on institutional discrimination.
Additionally, the process often leaves both sides dissatisfied: the
employer professes to have been cheated and claims that it only
settled to get rid of the disgruntled employee or applicant, at the
least bother and expense; the plaintiff often feels undercompensated for what he or she claims to have suffered or lost, and the
employer is free to do the same thing to somebody else of the
plaintiff's race or sex.
Therefore, the rule 23 class action device5 7 is particularly appropriate for resolving employment discrimination cases, which are
often, by their very nature, class suits challenging pervasive discrimination or policies or practices that adversely impact on protected groups. 5 In the South, where the federal judiciary was repeatedly called upon to enforce Title VII, the Fifth Circuit in the
1970's and early 1980's instructed the district courts to certify
"across-the-board" classes, including both applicants and employees claiming promotion discrimination on little more evidence than
the allegations in a complaint. 59 This broad approach was supported by the United States Supreme Court's statement that the
class certification decision should not entail a mini-hearing on the
FED. R. CIv. P. 23. Rule 23 provides in part:
(a)Prerequisites to a Class Action.
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of fact or law common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.

57

Id.
58 See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982) (recognizing "suits
alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving
classwide wrongs") (quoting East Texas Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405
(1977)).
59 See Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 835 (1978); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1123-25 (5th
Cir. 1969).
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merits.60 A liberal approach to class certification had also been articulated by the Second Circuit in Woe v. Cuomo,61 in which the
court noted that a class which is found to have been improperly
certified can always be decertified.2 By contrast, where class certification is wrongly denied, the error cannot be easily rectified because plaintiffs may be barred from obtaining the discovery necessary to challenge the denial on appeal.
However, in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,6 3 a particularly
unfocused and weak case, the United States Supreme Court disapproved of the Fifth Circuit's across-the-board rule and instructed
the federal judiciary that the rule 23 requirements of commonality,
typicality, numerosity, and adequacy of representation could not
be presumed. 4
Falcon did not place a particularly difficult burden upon a
plaintiff seeking to obtain class certification. Yet, as the Second
Circuit noted, after Falcon, "courts have been generally strict in
their application of the Rule 23(a) criteria."65 This strictness varies
from case to case and from circuit to circuit, offering little guidance to the potential class litigants. The Second Circuit has been
no exception, having recently decided two cases that are difficult, if
not impossible, to reconcile.
In the first case, Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather,6" the Second Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by decertifying a class represented by one plaintiff as to promotion and training claims. The court also held the district court committed error
in preventing another named plaintiff from representing the class7
on the ground that she was allegedly an officer of the company.6
In reaching this decision, the court "recognized .

.

. that the pri-

mary thrust of Falcon was that the satisfaction of Rule 23(a) requirements may not be presumed."68 The court noted that the
named plaintiff did not ask the district court to make this presumption.69 Instead, she sought to show that the defendant denied
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
729 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 936 (1984).
82

Id. at 107.

457 U.S. 147 (1982).
Id. at 157-59.
" Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 597 (2d Cir. 1986).
68 798 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1986).

64

67 Id. at 595, 599, 606.
68

Id. at 597 (citations omitted).

69

Id. at 598.
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women opportunities to advance through the use of a subjective
job evaluation system and that many of the decisions affecting employees' opportunities for advancement were made by the same,
central group of people.7 0 The court stated that the named plaintiff's "evidence, if believed, would indicate that [the defendant]
discriminated 'in the same general fashion'" against the plaintiff
and other class members and concluded that "no more was necessary" to satisfy the typicality requirement.7 1 The court added that
the named plaintiff's satisfaction of this requirement "goes a long
way" toward satisfying the commonality requirement and also relied on the factual similarity between the individual claim and the
class claim, even though the individual claim "also required proof
of some facts that differed from those of the class claim[s]. ' 2 Finally, the court held that the district court had "overlooked the
common thread" between the named plaintiff's transfer claim and
the class claim of discrimination in promotion.73 Emphasizing that
"it was the same standardless subjective evaluation system that
operated in both cases, 7 4 the court held that common issues of law
and fact predominated over those that separated the named plain7 51
tiff from the class.
The Rossini court's reading of Falcon and its flexible interpretation of the necessary factual predicate for class certification contrast sharply with the analysis in Sheehan v. Purolator,Inc.71 The
named plaintiffs in Sheehan were two staff vice-presidents and a
senior regional manager of the company who alleged sex discrimination in salaries and promotions as well as a hostile work environment. 7 The district court, stating it was relying on Falcon, denied
class certification.7 s However, the district court made this determination based on a requirement not mentioned in Falcon (or in rule
23) "that the individual plaintiffs establish that there are aggrieved
persons in the purported class, primarily through affidavits from
employees alleging discriminatory treatment, or other evidence esId.
Id.
72 Id. at 598-99.
73 Id. at 599.
70
71

74 Id.
75 Id.

78 839 F.2d 99 (2d
77 Id. at 100-01.
78

Id.

Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988).
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tablishing the existence of an aggrieved class. '7 In Sheehan, the
plaintiffs had in fact presented complaints of fifty-six employees of
the defendant, but the district court rejected fifty-five of them for
a variety of reasons.80 Because the district court found only one
affidavit to be acceptable, it concluded that plaintiffs had not
proved the existence of an aggrieved class.8 1 The district court also
held that the "raw statistics" proffered by plaintiffs did not establish that there was an aggrieved class of female employees since
the statistics did not offer relevant comparisons of similarly situated female and male employees, nor did they indicate that other
female employees felt aggrieved.82
The district court went on to find that even if the plaintiffs
had demonstrated the existence of an aggrieved class, the named
plaintiffs were not appropriate representatives because they were
high-level employees and the circumstances of their employment
were "particularly unique. '1 3 The court specifically noted that
"considerations that underlie a decision regarding a lateral transfer
from an upper level staff position to an equivalent line position are
'hardly typical' of the considerations underlying a...
transfer be'84
tween lower level positions.
The district court decision in Sheehan preceded Rossini and
seems to conflict with it. As stated above, the Sheehan court imposed a requirement not mentioned in Falcon or rule 23: that
plaintiffs prove by affidavits the existence of a class that "feel[s]
aggrieved." 85 Moreover, it relies on relatively minor factual distinctions between employees, while the Rossini court stressed the
"common thread" to be found, for example, between employees
making promotion and transfer claims."' Nonetheless, the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court denial of class certification in
Sheehan "on the ground of lack of class-wide proof of an aggrieved
7' Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 641, 648 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 839 F.2d 99
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988).
80 Id. at 649. For example, eight were brought by exempt employees, five resulted in
formal complaints with governmental agencies, two were dismissed by these governmental
agencies for lack of probable cause, and one of the affiants was a male. Id.
8' Id.
82 Id. at 656.

85
88

Id. at 651-52.
Id. at 654.
Sheehan, 103 F.R.D. at 649.
See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 599 (2d Cir. 1986).
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class. 11 7 It also discussed the district court's new requirement that
to successfully achieve class certification, a plaintiff must submit
affidavits from employees who feel aggrieved. 8 The court held
"that the [district] court was not clearly erroneous in concluding
that only one such affidavit was relevant; and that submitting an
affidavit from only one aggrieved employee, other than the named
plaintiffs, was insufficient to establish a class of aggrieved individuals." 89 Additionally, the Second Circuit held that the district court
was not clearly erroneous in requiring that statistical data
presented by plaintiffs at the class action stage must control for
various relevant nondiscriminatory factors such as education, prior
job history, or job level.9 0
After Sheehan, civil rights lawyers representing plaintiffs
know the defense will charge them with submitting "not enough"
affidavits in support of class certification. In fact, the need to submit such affidavits defeats the class action concept. First, it places
the burden on the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney to solicit such
affidavits from current or former employees of the defendant. The
attempt to communicate with current employees could lead to accusations of unethical conduct.9 1 Second, very few employees, even
if they feel aggrieved, will be brave enough to cooperate with somebody suing their boss because fear of retaliation is universal. Even
former employees resist giving affidavits involving their prior employers: those who do not have new jobs are concerned about references, while those who are employed want to maintain their reputations as team players and are unwilling to embroil themselves in
controversies with former employers.
Moreover, the requirement that affidavits from potential class
members be submitted raises the issue of how many are
enough-one from a corporation of 200 employees, 100 from a corporation of 10,000 employees? The numbers game simply does not
87 Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 839 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891
(1988).
0 See id. at 102-04.
"

Id. at 103.

Id. Moreover, the Sheehan court also agreed with the district court that even the
existence of a transportation department manual containing discriminatory statements was
insufficient to justify certifying a class since "there was evidence from which the fact-finder
reasonably could conclude that they were not in effect at corporate headquarters." Id.
"1 See Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 374-75, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1035-36, 559 N.Y.S.2d
493, 498-99 (1990) (discussing ethical consequences of communicating with adversary's
employees).
'
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make sense, nor does the district court's rule in Sheehan that each
affiant have filed an administrative complaint that resulted in a
probable cause finding.9 2 This standard is actually more onerous
than that placed upon named plaintiffs because an individual can
file a federal action without having received a probable cause finding from a federal or state agency.9 Finally, and most importantly,
if the plaintiff has submitted evidence of a common practice or
policy that may violate the civil rights laws, why should five or fifty
non-party affidavits be necessary to add to the showing? If a class
certification motion is not to be treated as a trial on the merits,94
such an overwhelmingly evidentiary showing should be entirely unnecessary. The need for this evidentiary showing also conflicts with
the court's directive in Woe that class certification be liberally
granted because an appropriate decertification motion can be made
at a later time.9 5 It also serves to wear out the plaintiff and his or
her counsel, overburden the court with paperwork, engender endless argumentation concerning the meaning of that paper and
make the class action device so unwieldy that plaintiffs, attorneys
and courts will naturally tend to shy away from bringing and certifying these suits.
The existence of both the Rossini and Sheehan cases as Second Circuit precedent leaves civil rights plaintiffs in limbo. While
Rossini creates a standard that can be met without the necessity of
a mini-trial on the merits and after reasonably narrow class action
discovery, the Sheehan decision makes plaintiffs' attorneys wary of
seeking class certification before extensive discovery has taken
place. Moreover, the individual proclivities of district court judges
will appear to control whether or not a case can be certified as a
class action. Those judges with a favorable view of class actions can
apply one test, and those who wish to narrow the scope of cases
before them can apply another.
12 See Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 641, 649 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd, 839 F.2d
99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988).
11 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (agency determination of lack of reasonable cause does not preclude suit against employer in federal court). It
is not uncommon for agencies to dismiss meritorious complaints for lack of probable cause.
As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissenting opinion in Kremer, "inadequate staffing of
state agencies can lead to 'a tendency to dismiss too many complaints for alleged lack of
probable cause.'" Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 507 (1982) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); see also infra note 207 and accompanying text.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 936 (1984).
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The court's apparent move in Sheehan toward restricting the
use of class actions is especially chilling because the decision of a
district court judge in this area is nonreviewable prior to a final
judgment on the merits. 6 A civil rights plaintiff and attorney
therefore are faced with the prospect that a judge rigidly applying
the Sheehan rationale may squelch the objective of the client prior
to meaningful discovery and trial. The attorney and client are thus
left with the option of continuing the case through limited discovery and a circumscribed trial in order to appeal after final judgment. Realistically, many plaintiffs placed in this position will accept an individual settlement package, complete with a
confidentiality order. From the point of view of the civil rights
plaintiff and attorney, this resolution may be a disaster. First, the
plaintiff has failed to meet his or her objective of testing the challenged corporate practices. Additionally, plaintiff's attorneys representing clients who have limited resources often handle employment discrimination cases based upon the prospect of receiving
reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to statute."' When a district
court denies class certification, the plaintiff's attorney may have
lost hundreds of hours of time spent preparing the class certification motion, unless the work was also necessary in order to pursue
the case on the merits.
Therefore, after Sheehan, a private civil rights attorney must
view the bringing of a class action as extraordinarily risky business.
As a result, policies and practices that are infected with or result in
racism and sexism may be left intact to fester.
III.

SECTION

1981

No recent United States Supreme Court case has done more
damage to the enforcement of individual employment discrimination cases based upon race than Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union."8 In Patterson, the Court, after threatening to eliminate
one of the Civil War statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as a means of protecting the right of minorities to contract for their services on the
same basis as whites, contented itself with narrowly interpreting
96 See United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 396 (1977).
e' See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988) (court has discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing party).
98 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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the meaning of "making and enforcement of contracts."9' 9 Focusing
on the narrow issues before it, the Court ruled that racial harassment on the job was not actionable under section 1981 since it did
not involve the formation of a contract or its enforcement, but only
the "terms" of the employment contract.1 00 With regard to plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination in promotions, the Court held
that such a claim would be actionable under section 1981 "[o]nly
where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new
and distinct relation between the employee and the employer." 10 1
The Court left unanswered the question of whether viable section
1981 claims exist for suits alleging terminations of employment
contracts based on race discrimination.
Even absent section 1981, aggrieved persons would still have a
cause of action for racial discrimination in employment under Title
VII. Plaintiffs' claims, however, would certainly be worth significantly less if they were limited to Title VII. Under section 1981,
plaintiffs are entitled to a jury, which may award compensatory
damages for the pain, suffering, and humiliation of racial discrimination, as well as punitive damages. 02 By contrast, under Title
VII, an individual plaintiff is limited to compensation only for economic loss in the form of wages and benefits.10 3 Patterson'srestrictions on section 1981 actions inevitably will mean that many fewer
employment discrimination cases based on race will be filed in the
federal courts. Assume, for example, that a low-paid person is terminated on the basis of race and is out of work for a relatively
short period of time thereafter. That person will have difficulty
showing much economic loss under Title VII. As a result, such a
9' Id. at 180. The Court originally granted certiorari to decide whether plaintiff's racial
harassment claim was actionable under § 1981 and whether the jury instruction on the
§ 1981 promotion claim was erroneous. However, after oral argument on these issues, the
Court asked the parties to brief and argue the question of whether Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976), should be overruled. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171. Runyon had held that
§ 1981 prohibited racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts.
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 172-73.
109 491 U.S. at 179.
10 Id. at 185.

.02See id. at 211-12 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"I'Id. Plaintiff may sometimes obtain pain and suffering damages under state antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982). For Example, the Second Circuit has held that in New York an Executive Law claim can be brought in federal
court as a pendent state claim, where plaintiff has not previously filed a charge with the
New York State Division of Human Rights or where the New York State Division of Human
Rights has dismissed the charge for administrative convenience. See Promisel v. First Am.
Artificial Flowers, Inc., 1991 WL 168373 (2d Cir. Sept. 4, 1991).

1991]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

victim of racial discrimination will rarely file a complaint and the
conduct of the employer will go unpunished and unchecked.
The circuit courts have struggled with the issue of whether
Pattersonforecloses termination claims under section 1981. By the
time the Second Circuit received a case raising this issue, other
circuits had considered the question. The Eighth Circuit had ruled
in Hicks v. Brown Group0 that Pattersondoes not foreclose a termination claim under section 1981.105 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, have ruled that Patterson does eliminate such
claims. 0 6
Faced with this conflict, the Second Circuit chose the more
10 7
restrictive approach. It ruled in Gonzalez v. Home Insurance Co.
that run-of-the-mill termination claims under section 1981 should
8 The court, however, did crebe dismissed in light of Patterson.'"
ate an exception. It ruled that if a plaintiff could "in good faith"
allege that an employer intended at the time it entered into the
contract to dismiss the employee on the basis of race, the claim
may not be foreclosed. 0 9
Gonzalez was followed by Patterson v. Intercoast Management of Hartford,"0 in which another panel of the Second Circuit
reached the same conclusion and refused to allow the plaintiff to
replead based upon a claim that at the time of the formation of the
contract, the employer refused to contract on racially neutral
terms."' The court found such claims to be "dubious" under Patterson and ruled that highly specific proof of a racial nature would
be necessary to establish such a claim." 2 Because such proof is notoriously difficult to obtain," 3 few plaintiffs will be able to challenge terminations on this basis.
10 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990).
105 Id. at 635-48.
106 See Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 849 (9th

Cir. 1990); Lavender v. V&B Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 805, 807-08 (5th Cir.
1990).
107 909 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1990).
108 Id. at 722.
Id.
1" 918 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1686 (1991).
209

111 Id. at 14.
"-' Id.
For example, in cases where there are written employment contracts, the contracts would have to contain different terms for white and non-white employees.
1I
See, e.g., Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (because
evidence of overt racial motivation is hard to find, "courts must be alert to recognize means
that are subtle and explanations that are synthetic").
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In conclusion, the Second Circuit's restrictive reading of the
scope of section 1981 poses an additional and significant barrier to
the elimination of racial discrimination in employment.
IV.

USE OF SANCTIONS

From the outset, the 1983 amendments to rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" 4 had the potential for discouraging
civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys from prosecuting cases for
two reasons. First, the history of the law in this area is the history
of attempts, successful and unsuccessful, to extend, modify, or reverse existing law to provide greater protections for civil rights. To
sanction the filing and prosecution of such cases, unless courts find
that they are supported by "good faith argument[s]," 1 5 is to discourage attorneys from attempting to broaden legal protections for
individuals. Second, employment discrimination litigation almost
always involves litigation between two parties with vastly unequal
resources. The imposition of sanctions against an individual whose
job is already threatened or lost creates a much greater hardship
than does the imposition of sanctions against a corporate party.
The destructive use to which rule 11 and other sanctions provisions have been put in civil rights cases during the last seven years
has been discussed extensively by commentators." l6
The issue was recently raised in the Second Circuit in Greenberg v. Hilton International Co. ("Greenberg1").117 In Greenberg
I, the court addressed several issues concerning the appropriate" FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The 1983 amendments to rule 11 were adopted in response to
growing concern over the rule's failure to deter attorneys from engaging in abusive practices
and frivolous litigation. See id. advisory committee note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 198, 198.
The amendments changed the existing rule in a number of significant ways, including: (1)
extending applicability to all parties, not just attorneys; (2) requiring "reasonable inquiry"
before filing any paper or motion to ascertain the facts and the law upon which the paper is
based; (3) requiring that all motions made, or papers filed, be "well grounded in fact and...
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"; (4) imposing sanctions on the signor, the represented party, or both if a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of the rule. See J. MOORE & J. LUCAS,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.01[3] (2d ed. 1984).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
See, e.g., Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil
Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184-85 (1989) (procedural obstacles in rule 23 and substantive bias of rule 11 have crippling effect on civil rights actions); Grosberg, Illusion and
Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance: Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. Rav. 575, 645
n.279 (1987) (statistics suggest rule 11 used against civil rights claimants in disparate
proportions).
H 870 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Greenberg 1].
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ness of rule 11 sanctions in the context of an employment discrimination case. First, the court considered the appropriateness of discovery sanctions where plaintiff's counsel told the district court
she required certain documents to perform a professional statistical analysis, but after receiving the documents, did not submit
them to an expert.1 i8 On defendant's motion for sanctions, plaintiff's counsel explained that her own rough statistical analysis revealed that the documents would not prove discrimination and
that she therefore did not retain an expert to save money for her
client, who was chronically ill and living on Social Security. 119 The
Second Circuit panel initially reversed the district court's denial of
the motion and sanctioned the attorney for misleading the district
court about her intention to hire an expert.12 However, on rehearing in Greenberg v. Hilton International Co. ("Greenberg I"),121
the panel ordered the district court to examine counsel's document
analysis to determine whether it was sufficiently professional to
have fulfilled plaintiff's counsel's promise to the court.'22
The Greenberg I court also discussed the question of how subsequent case law affects obligations under rule 11.123 In Greenberg
I, the plaintiff alleged constructive discharge in her complaint,
which was filed in early 1984, and the claim survived a summary
judgment motion. 124 In 1985, however, the Second Circuit upheld
the dismissal of a constructive discharge claim in Martin v. Citibank,1 25 a case with facts that the court described as more egregious than those in Greenberg 1.112
Three years later, Greenberg's motion to dismiss her complaint because of poor health was granted by the district court. 27
At that point, the district court and the Second Circuit considered
whether plaintiff or her attorney should be sanctioned for having
failed to withdraw the constructive discharge claim after Martin

119

Id. at 937-39.
Id. at 933.

120

Id. at 938-39.

"s

121 875

F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Greenberg II].
Id. at 41-42. In Greenberg II, the court concluded that an award of attorneys' fees
should not be made against Greenberg herself because of her financial condition and because there was no indication that she affirmatively participated in pursuing the discovery.
Id. at 42.
"I'See Greenberg I, 870 F.2d at 936-37.
122

124

125

Id. at 929-30.
762 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1985).

128

See Greenberg I, 870 F.2d at 936-37.

127

Id. at 932-33.
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was decided.1 28 The Second Circuit held that counsel may not be
sanctioned under rule 11 for failing to withdraw a claim based on
papers that have previously survived a motion for summary judgment as long as that ruling was not obtained by misleading the
court, the adversary had not attempted to obtain withdrawal of
that claim based on a change or clarification of existing law, and
the claim had not been repeated in papers filed after the change or
clarification of law. 129
Greenberg had also raised a claim of promotion discrimination. With regard to that claim, the Second Circuit held:
Because the threshold for a prima facie case [of employment discrimination] is low, sanctions may be applied only when a reasonably competent attorney would conclude that there is not an evidentiary basis sufficient to cross even that threshold. Otherwise,
Rule 11 would chill not only the assertion of facially meritless
claims, but also claims that are weak but potentially viable. 30
The court also noted that, at the outset, plaintiff's counsel had reason to believe that her client's claim had a factual basis and was
entitled to rely upon her client's statements, "particularly since
much of the relevant information was within the control of the
defendant."13
Significantly, the court on rehearing addressed the NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund's argument as amicus curiae
that "the wide-spread use of Rule 11 in civil rights cases has discouraged private counsel from taking such cases.' 3 2 The court explained that in its original opinion sanctioning plaintiff's counsel it
did not intend to chill Title VII claims per se, but merely to sanction discovery misconduct. 3
Despite this disclaimer, several facets of this case raise troubling issues for civil rights cases in particular. First, with regard to
the question of discovery sanctions, the vastly different economic
resources of the parties make it likely that a plaintiff's decisions
concerning whether or not to hire an expert will be much more
painful,, difficult and subject to change than those of a defend128 See id. at 936-37.
129

Id. at 937.

130 Id. at 935.
131
112
133

Id.
Greenberg 11, 875 F.2d at 42.

Id.
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ant.134 Second, at the outset of an employment discrimination case,
unlike many other cases, much of the relevant information is
within the defendant's control. 13 5 Moreover, the increasing stringency of the burdens of proof in civil rights cases makes the necessary statistical analyses more and more time-consuming and expensive, requiring greatly increased amounts of data.136 The
extensive discovery needed to prove a Title VII case, coupled with
defendant's resistance to such discovery, can drag out these cases
for many years, which is what happened before GreenbergI came
to trial. During the course of litigation, it is not uncommon for a
plaintiff's financial situation to deteriorate.
The court's analysis of the constructive discharge claim also
raises difficult issues. If defendant had moved for summary judgment again after the Martin decision, would plaintiff's counsel
have been ethically prohibited from opposing the motion? The
Martin case did not involve a new rule of constructive discharge
law, merely the application of that law to a different set of facts.
Since all these cases are highly fact-specific, reasonable attorneys
and judges can differ as to whether the facts in one case are more
or less egregious than those in another. In the absence of definitive
Supreme Court standards with respect to constructive discharge,
plaintiffs should not be sanctioned for pressing such claims in a
variety of factual contexts.
Finally, neither Greenberg I nor Greenberg II discusses the
special role courts have assigned to plaintiffs in civil rights actions
as private attorneys general, enforcing statutes not only for individual benefit, but for the greater good.1 37 Therefore, despite the
i

See West V. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (1991) (expert witness fees

not recoverable by prevailing party).
15 See, e.g., Greenberg I, 870 F.2d at 935 (noting that relevant information was within
control of defendants).
"S'See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-55 (1989) (plaintiffs'
statistical analysis flawed for failing to consider differences in qualifications between two
pools of workers); Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 839 F.2d 99, 103-04 (2d Cir.) (upholding district court ruling that plaintiff's statistical evidence was flawed for failing to take into account relevant nondiscriminatory factors), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988).
11"See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (plaintiff seeking
injunction under Civil Rights Act of 1964 "does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private attorney general' vindicating a [congressional] policy"); Red Bull Assocs. v. Best W.
Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 966 (2d Cir. 1988) (as "private attorneys general," plaintiffs carry
out important civil rights objectives). The term "private attorney general" first was used by
the Second Circuit in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), to describe any private individual who would "vindicate the public interest." Id. at 695.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:839

court's assurances to the contrary, the Greenberg decisions may, in
fact, have a chilling effect on litigation of employment discrimination cases by plaintiffs of limited means.
V.

PROBLEMS OF PROOF

Employment discrimination cases have long been classified for
purposes of analysis into two types: disparate treatment and disparate impact. The broad contours of the former type of case have
long been established by the United States Supreme Court. 3 ' Essentially, two issues have beenleft to the lower courts: how much
evidence is necessary to show that an allegedly nondiscriminatory
reason was, in fact, a pretext for discrimination; and what standard
of causation should be applied.
Concerning the first issue, it is undisputed that pretext can be
very difficult to prove. The Second Circuit in particular has long
been sensitive to the difficulties plaintiffs face in proving that a
decision was improperly motivated. Thus, in Robinson v. 12 Lofts
Realty, Inc., 39 a case involving alleged discrimination against a
black prospective buyer of a cooperative apartment, 4 0 the court
emphasized:
In its deliberations, the [district] court must remember that
"clever men may easily conceal their motivations." "As overtly
bigoted behavior has become more unfashionable, evidence of intent has become harder to find. But this does not mean that racial discrimination has disappeared." It means that when a discriminatory effect is present, the courts must be alert to recognize
" See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981)
(describing plaintiff's burden in establishing case of disparate treatment and defendant's
burden on rebuttal); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (four
circumstances plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination).
610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
340 Id. at 1033. Case law involving Title VIII, the Fair Housing Act, has long been held
to be analogous to case law interpreting Title VII and vice versa. See, e.g., NAACP v. Town
of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir.) (noting "parallel between Title VII and Title
VIII" as part of coordinated anti-discriminatory plan of Congress), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988);
Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (5th Cir. 1982) ("anti-discrimination objectives of Title VIII are parallel to goals of Title VII"); Resident Advisory Bd. v, Rizzo, 564
F.2d 126, 146-48 (3d Cir. 1977) (comparing Titles VII and VIII to decide Title VIII case),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). The United States Supreme Court has held that both
Title VII and Title VIII should be broadly construed to promote the congressional purpose
of eliminating discrimination. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
211-12 (1972) (Title VIII must be construed expansively to promote integrated housing);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1971) (broad application of Title VII necessary to achieve congressional objective of ensuring equal employment opportunities).
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means that are subtle and explanations that are synthetic.14, 1
Sweeney v. Research Foundation of the State University of
New York 142 appears to stray somewhat from the stringent standard set forth in Robinson. In Sweeney, an employment discrimination case involving sex discrimination, the Second Circuit did
note that the evidence produced by the defendant should be "objective and competent. Subjective evaluations are not adequate by
themselves because they may mask prohibited prejudice.' 14' However, the district court did not critically scrutinize the "objective
reasons" proffered by the defendant and concluded that the defendant's "exercise of traditional management prerogatives constituted a legitimate and non-discriminatory basis for [the] defendant's actions.' 44 The Second Circuit reviewed the evidence and
held that 45 the district court's conclusion was not clearly
erroneous.
More recent'Second Circuit cases have continued to instruct
lower courts to scrutinize carefully defendants' proffered reasons,
as well as the circumstances surrounding challenged termination
decisions. Thus, in Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 46 the
court stated that "[iun assessing the inferences to be drawn from
the circumstances of the termination, the court must be alert to
the fact that '[e]mployers are rarely so cooperative as to include a
notation in the personnel file' that the firing is for a reason expressly forbidden by law."'14 7 More recently, in Sumner v. United
States Postal Service,14 s the Second Circuit held that a supervisor's remark that plaintiff had a "war-like attitude" lent credence
to the claim of discriminatory animus, seen in the context of the
supervisor's hostility toward the plaintiff and the plaintiff's history
of charging racism. 14 The Second Circuit, therefore, reversed the
decision of the district judge dismissing Sumner's complaint after
trial. 150 Similarly, in Rosen v. Thornburgh,151 the Second Circuit
610 F.2d at 1043 (citations omitted).
711 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1983).
"I Id. at 1185 (citations omitted).
44 Id. at 1186.
145 Id.
141 Robinson,
142

146 865 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1989).

'4Id. at 464-65 (quoting Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633,
638 (5th Cir. 1985)).
148899 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1990).
149 Id. at 210-11.
"I0Id. at 211. A similarly searching analysis by the Second Circuit of an employer's
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recognized
that employment discrimination is often accomplished by discreet
manipulations and hidden under a veil of self-declared innocence.
An employer who discriminates is unlikely to leave a "smoking
gun," such as a notation in an employee's personnel file, attesting
to a discriminatory intent. A victim of discrimination is therefore
seldom able to prove his or her claim by direct evidence and is
usually constrained to rely on the cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence." 2
So-called pattern and practice cases, group disparate treatment cases in which statistics are used to make out a prima facie
case, should be distinguished from the common individual disparate treatment cases described above. The Second Circuit, following the lead of the United States Supreme Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,'53 has placed a much
heavier burden on plaintiffs in that situation, scrutinizing carefully
the statistical evidence presented. For example, in J. Ste. Marie v.
Eastern Railroad,5 4 the plaintiffs' expert had shown that women
were overrepresented in clerical positions and underrepresented in
technical and managerial positions. 155 However, the court held that
the data were flawed because they did not analyze whether women
in clerical positions (such as secretaries and typists) were qualified
for, or interested in, the higher level jobs. 5 '
Another controversial issue in disparate treatment litigation
that raged throughout the 1980's was causation: must an individual
stated reasons for the challenged action revealed pretext in Ibrahim v. New York State
Dep't of Health, 904 F.2d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Department's proffered reasons were
patently pretextual"). In Schmitz v. St. Regis Paper Co., 811 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1987), the
Second Circuit affirmed a district court decision finding pretext based on explanations by
defendant that changed over time. Id. at 133.
151 928 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1991).
152 Id.
at 533 (citations omitted).
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
650 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1981).
155 Id. at 400.
156 Id.
The court stated that the burden that is shifted to the defendant once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case is not a burden of persuasion, but rather a burden of production requiring the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the minority employee. See id. at 399 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973)). In a pattern and practice disparate treatment case, as in an individual disparate
treatment case, the burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff throughout the action. See
id.; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (in an
individual disparate treatment case burden of persuasion remains on plaintiff throughout
action).
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prove that discrimination was a "but for" cause of the protested
decision, simply a cause of the decision, or something in be158
tween? 157 The plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins

sets forth the view that an employee should not be required to
show that sex, for example, was a "but for" cause of the challenged
decision. 15 Instead, Justice Brennan suggested that where an em-

ployee proved that sex was a motivating factor in the employment
decision, the burden should shift to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered sex as a factor.160 Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, however,
stressed that the "mixed motive" formulation should only apply
where a plaintiff presented direct evidence of discrimination, and
required plaintiff to show under this formulation that the improper motive was a "substantial" factor.161 This analysis excludes
the majority of disparate treatment cases, which are supported
only by circumstantial evidence, from those, like Price
Waterhouse, in which the plaintiff actually has direct evidence of
discrimination.
In the wake of Price Waterhouse, the courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit, have blurred the distinction between
16 2
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion and the plurality opinion.

Thus, in Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 63 the Second Circuit held:
Once the plaintiff establishes by direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a motivating or substantial role in an employment decision, the burden falls to the defendant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the illegitimate factor into
account."'
157 Compare Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986) ("but for" cause) with Berl v. Westchester County, 849
F.2d 712, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1988) ("substantial part").
118 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
See id. at 239-42.

1' Id. at 244-45.
161 Id. at 276-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162 The plurality opinion was written by Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justices
Marshall, Blaclknun, and Stevens. Id. at 228-58. Justice White and Justice O'Connor each
filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 258-79. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 279-95.
163 880 F.2d 1564 (2d Cir. 1989).
164Id. at 1568 (emphasis added) (citing plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor's con-
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In Barbano v. Madison County,165 the Second Circuit elaborated

on the need to present "direct" evidence. In that case, the court
held that "the key inquiry on this aspect of the case is whether the
evidence is direct, that is, whether it shows that the impermissible
'166
criterion played some part in the decision-making process.

These interpretations of Price Waterhouse, however, leave
open the question of the causation requirement in cases where the
only evidence of discrimination is circumstantial. A recent Second
Circuit case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
19671 held that the impermissible factor must be "a factor that
made a difference" in making the decision."68 After Price
Waterhouse, this standard appears to be a reasonable compromise
between a "but for" cause standard and the more lenient standards that apply where there is direct evidence of discrimination.
The sensitivity of the federal courts towards the difficulties in
proving discriminatory treatment cases contrasts with their attitudes toward discriminatory impact cases. The Second Circuit has
been no exception. For example, in Zahorik v. Cornell Univer70
' the court, following Pouncy v. PrudentialInsurance Co.,
sity,"69
required that plaintiffs prove that "clear and convincing" evidence
of a "substantially discriminatory effect" exists before an impact
standard can be applied.11 The court cited three cases in support
of this requirement: International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 7 2 and Grant v. Bethlehem Steel

Corp.'7 However, none of these cases set forth the requirement
that disparate impact be proved by "clear and convincing evidence" rather than by the usual "preponderance of the evidence."
While the requirement that disparate impact be proved by "clear
and convincing evidence" has not been widely adopted, courts have
continued to increase the burden of proof required of plaintiffs to
prove a disparate impact case.

curring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
"' 922 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1990).
Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
"
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
"' Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 884 F.2d 707, 707 (2d Cir.), modifying 865 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1169 (1990).
"' 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984).
170 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
. Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 96.
172 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
173 635 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1988).
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For example, in 1988, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
Co.,17 4 the United States Supreme Court held that the disparate
impact analysis may, in principle, be applied to subjective as well
as objective employment practices.7 5 However, the Court then
modified the evidentiary standards for disparate impact cases. The
Court held that to prove a prima facie case, the plaintiffs must
identify the specific employment practice challenged and "offer
statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the
practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs
or promotions because of their membership in a protected
group.''17 6 The Court held that the statistical disparities presented
by plaintiff "must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such
77
an inference of causation.'
The following year in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,'7 8
the United States Supreme Court again made it significantly
harder to prove a case of disparate impact. Under Wards Cove,
plaintiffs must demonstrate "that the disparity they complain of is
the result of one or more of the employment practices that they
are attacking... specifically showing that each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities for whites and nonwhites. '"'7 9 The Wards Cove Court also significantly changed the law by holding that in a disparate impact
case the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all
times, 80 so it is now the plaintiff, not the defendant, who carries
the burden of proving there is no legitimate business justification
for defendant's action. If the plaintiff cannot persuade the trier of
fact on the question of the business necessity defense, he or she
must "persuade the factfinder that 'other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer's legitimate [hiring] interest[s].' ,,s' By placing heavier
burdens on plaintiffs in establishing a prima facie case and disproving the business justification defense, Wards Cove made it
much more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.
The Second Circuit has interpreted Wards Cove strictly. In
174 487 U.S. 977 (1988).

15 Id. at 999-1000.
"' Id. at 994 (emphasis added).
:7

Id. at 995.

178

490 U.S. 642 (1989).

:79

Id. at 657.

11 See id. at 660 ("persuasion burden ... must remain with plaintiff").
Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
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EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee ("JAC"),18 2 the court
considered a case factually very similar to Griggs, the case in which
the disparate impact standard was first enunciated. 183 The Joint
Apprenticeship Committee ("JAC") administered an apprentice
1
training program that had a high school diploma requirement. 8
The EEOC alleged that the diploma'requirement discriminated
against blacks.1 85 In support of their motion for partial summary
judgment, the EEOC presented statistics showing that blacks constituted 18.3% of the pertinent pool of potential applicants, but
only 12.2% of the actual applicant pool.1 88 The EEOC also proved
that 89.2% of whites between the ages of nineteen and twenty-two
had high school diplomas, whereas only 68.3% of blacks in the
same age group had high school diplomas and that a higher percentage of black applicants than white applicants lacked diplomas.1 87 Therefore, the EEOC argued that the use of the high school
diploma criterion had an adverse impact on blacks. 88 In addition,
the EEOC presented statistics demonstrating the disparity in
JAC's evaluation of black and white applicants: a much higher percentage of white applicants than black applicants was found
189
acceptable.
The district court granted the EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment.19 0 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit vacated
the district court's order. 9 1 The court quoted the Wards Cove language stating that plaintiffs must demonstrate "that the disparity
they complain of is the result of one or more of the employment
practices that they are attacking here, specifically showing that
each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on
162
163

895 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1990).
See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 ("Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse-

quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation") (emphasis in original). The
Wards Cove Court did not specifically overrule Griggs.
18,Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 895 F.2d at 87. The program also required that applicants be no more than 22 years of age if they had not served in the armed forces and no
more than 26 years of age if they were veterans. Id. The EEOC challenged this latter requirement on the ground of sex discrimination. Id.
185

Id.

166 Id.
167 Id.
166

Id.

169

Id.

at 87-88.
at 88.

160 Id. at 89.

'1 Id. at 91.
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employment opportunities for whites and nonwhites. '192 In JAC,
the EEOC seems to have met this burden by showing that the particular employment practice-the high school diploma requirement-adversely impacted minorities because fewer minorities
than whites had high school diplomas.1 9 3 This was precisely the
94
case in Griggs.1
However, the Second Circuit, not even citing
Griggs, held that "in order to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII, the plaintiff must establish that the
challenged employment practice caused the statistical disparity. ' 195 The Second Circuit criticized the district court for not requiring the plaintiffs to meet the standard and required that the
district court further consider the matter in light of the principles
98
set forth in Wards Cove.
While the Second Circuit specifically expressed "no view as to
the sufficiency of EEOC's statistics to establish the requisite disparities, or as to whether summary judgment is appropriate with
respect to the issue of causation, 1 197 it also gave no guidance to the
district court about the meaning of the "causation" requirement,
or how plaintiffs can meet this burden. For example, it is unclear
whether the court meant to subject plaintiffs to the onerous requirement of proving that each rejected black applicant was rejected because of the lack of a high school diploma. This would
only be possible where the potential employer had kept scrupulously detailed records, all of which were made available to plaintiffs. On the other hand, the district court may find on remand
that the high school diploma statistics presented by the EEOC
were sufficient to meet the causation requirement. 9 8
It may be that courts are now fundamentally uncomfortable
with the idea that an employment practice may be racially discriminatory without proof that the employer intended it to be so.
Yet, the use by employers of facially neutral requirements such as
high school diplomas obviously can have a devastating impact on
Id. at 90 (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657).
'3 See id. at 88.
104 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427 (defendant company required high school diploma
for
assignment to any department but labor and for any transfer out of labor).
:05 Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 895 F.2d at 90.
1"Id. at 91.
:92

:07

Id.

03 Cf. Lowe v. Commack Union Free School Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (2d Cir.
1989) (disparate impact case must focus on specific procedure, not hiring process as a
whole), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 (1990).
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minority hiring. Moreover, it is equally obvious that a high school
diploma, for example, is not needed for many jobs. If non-job related criteria are left in place in a society in which minorities and
women have fewer credentials than white men, these disadvantaged groups will continue to be excluded from many forms of employment. Any serious judicial effort to create greater workplace
equality must therefore include clear and workable standards for
disparate impact claims as well as for disparate treatment claims.
VI.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

Fear is never far from the minds of employees who claim their
employers have discriminated against them and wish to challenge
the offensive conduct. Civil rights attorneys counseling such persons inevitably discuss the practical meaning of Title VII's
prohibitions against retaliation. Put simply, prospective plaintiffs
want to know whether their lawyers can keep them on the job if
they are retaliated against after filing charges or if they may find
themselves on the street without any immediate, effective remedy.
Some prospective plaintiffs who have been discharged for what
they claim to be discriminatory reasons in violation of Title VII
also want to know whether they can be restored to work prior to
going through the entire administrative process and prosecuting
federal court actions to conclusion.
The Second Circuit ruled at a fairly early stage of interpreting
Title VII that an employee who was fired from a position for allegedly discriminatory reasons could not obtain preliminary relief.
The theory of the court was that the employee could not show irreparable harm. 19 While this reasoning was harsh in that the alleged victim of discrimination would have to find other employment, the court held that a -defendant employer would not be
required to reinstate such an employee before a court found that
the employee's discharge was discriminatory.
Plaintiffs who allege they have been discharged in retaliation
for their opposition to discrimination present far greater equitable
claims for immediate reinstatement. The Second Circuit explained
19 See Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 610 (2d Cir. 1978) (teachers seeking
to enjoin school board's ethnicity survey denied injunction for failure to show possible irreparable injury or probable success on merits); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 123132 (2d Cir. 1974) (plaintiff seeking preliminary injunction against "demotion" denied relief
for failure to show irreparable harm or likelihood of success on merits).
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in a 1982 opinion:
[W]e think it plain that for the court to renounce its incidental
equity jurisdiction to stay such employer retaliation pending the
EEOC's consideration would frustrate Congress's purposes. Unimpeded retaliation during the now-lengthy (180-day) conciliation
period is likely to diminish the EEOC's ability to achieve conciliation. It is likely to have a chilling effect on the complainant's fellow employees who might otherwise desire to assert their equal
rights, or to protest the employer's discriminatory acts, or to cooperate with the investigation of a discrimination charge. And in
many cases the effect on the complainant of several months without work or working in humiliating or otherwise intolerable circumstances will constitute harm that cannot adequately be reme200
died by a later award of damages.
The Second Circuit, however, immediately began to retreat from
this position. The very next year, the court ruled that it would not
"accept the EEOC's suggestion that there is irreparable injury sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction in every retaliation
case. 20 1 Instead, the court directed the district court to judge the
possibility of weakened civil rights enforcement as one factor to be
weighed in determining whether irreparable injury exists.20 2 Moreover, the court held that the district court judge on remand could
consider claims that hostility existed between the plaintiff and her
former colleagues as a factor militating against preliminary relief.203 Suggestively, the Second Circuit also noted that there was
precedent to award monetary damages rather than reinstatement
in a retaliatory discharge case even after a ruling on the merits. 4
The Second Circuit's last ruling in this line of cases was Stewart v. Immigration & NaturalizationService,205~in which the court
acknowledged that its earlier cases recognized the potential chilling
effect of a retaliatory discharge "as an example of an extraordinary
circumstance which might constitute irreparable harm. 20 8 However, the court held that proof that the discharge was degrading
200 Sheehan, 676 F.2d at 885-886 (footnote omitted).
201 Holt v. Continental Group, 708 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1030 (1984).
202

Id.

203 Id.
204 Id. (citing EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y.

1976), affd mem., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977)).
205 762 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1985).
206

Id. at 200.
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and humiliating and that it damaged the reputation of the victim
of retaliation and prevented the victim from adequately providing
for his or her family was insufficient to constitute irreparable
harm. 01 Clearly, the Second Circuit was sending a warning: plaintiffs alleging retaliatory discharge should not expect preliminary
injunctions ordering them reinstated unless they are able to provide proof of extraordinary damage. After Stewart, employment
discrimination lawyers are on notice to advise their clients that in
all likelihood the judicial system will not protect them from retaliatory discharge.
CONCLUSION

Given the almost complete lack of government enforcement in
the civil rights arena, 08 society relies upon individual plaintiffs,
who are often in financially straitened circumstances, to bring
high-risk cases to the attention of the federal judiciary. As described above, these plaintiffs and their lawyers operate at a tremendous disadvantage. In most cases, they find themselves opposed by large corporations with seemingly limitless resources or
by publicly funded counsel unworried about their day-to-day costs
and fees. By contrast, plaintiffs' lawyers in many cases must advance their own expenses over years of complex litigation. In addition, they will receive their fees only if their clients prevail, and
these fees will be determined by district courts exercising great
discretion. 09
Moreover, civil rights plaintiffs commonly operate in factually
uncharted territory. Rarely is there a case in this area of the law
207 Id. By contrast, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits presume irreparable harm in Title
VII retaliation cases. See, e.g., Baker v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 856 F.2d 167, 169 (11th
Cir. 1988) ("courts are to presume irreparable harm in Title VII cases"); Middleton-Keirn v.
Stone, 655 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1981) (for purposes of preliminary injunction in Title VII
cases, "irreparable injury is presumed").
208 See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 507 n.22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing problems
associated with administrative agency enforcement). The General Accounting Office reported that in six EEOC field offices and five state agencies, 40 to 80% of the cases closed
"were not fully investigated"; "critical evidence was not verified" in these cases; and "relevant witnesses were not interviewed in at least 20 percent" of the cases in seven of the 11
offices investigated. Hoopes, Working Late: The Case of the Myopic Watchdog, MOD. MATURITY (1989).
209 See, e.g., Jones v. Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir.
1983) ("[iut must be emphasized that a district court has broad discretion to determine the
amount of a fee award"); see also Holmes, supra note 56 (discussing difficulty in finding
lawyers to take employment discrimination cases).
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where the facts are undisputed and the only issues are legal. The
factual record must be painstakingly built from a vast array of
documentary evidence. Discovery battles are frequently lengthy
and hard-fought. The data collected more likely than not must
then be submitted to experts for time-consuming analysis. Plaintiffs and their lawyers who cannot afford this expensive and
2 10
drawn-out process have no choice but to withdraw their claims.

Despite these overwhelming difficulties, access to the federal
court for employment discrimination plaintiffs is extremely important. In difficult economic times, employers are unwilling or unable
to devote resources to ensuring that their policies are nondiscriminatory.2 11 Employees who complain about discrimination often are
accused of making trouble for American companies at a time when
such companies need to devote their full resources to making
themselves competitive, not to curing social ills for which they feel
they are not responsible.
In the face of overwhelming odds, civil rights plaintiffs and
their lawyers must rely on the federal courts to offer them the opportunity to vindicate the important congressional policy against
discriminatory employment practices. 21 2 Certainly, Second Circuit
rulings, such as Ramseur, which require the district courts to evaluate discrimination claims in depth and with sensitivity toward the
difficult problems of proof faced by plaintiffs, serve to level the
playing field. They make clear that a plaintiff should be given a
fair chance of overcoming a defendant's denial of discrimination.
On the other hand, appellate decisions that uphold unduly restrictive lower court class action decisions, rigidly interpret limitations, or virtually foreclose the possibility of obtaining preliminary
injunctions, deter plaintiffs and their attorneys from bringing potentially significant and necessary civil rights actions.21 3
210

See, e.g., Greenberg I, 870 F.2d at 932 (plaintiff moved to dismiss discrimination

complaint three years after suit was brought); see also supra notes 116-36 and accompanying text (discussing Greenberg decisions and their ramifications for civil rights plaintiffs).
22 During the course of their practice, the authors have encountered a considerable
number of persons who were formerly employed as equal employment opportunity specialists in corporate human resource departments. These persons report that in difficult economic times, the position of equal employment opportunity specialist is among the first to

be eliminated.
212 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60 (federal policy against discriminatory employment
best served by allowing plaintiffs to pursue Title VII action in federal courts).
21I See Sheehan, 839 F.2d at 106 (affirming denial of Title VII claim but "declin[ing] to
say that the judge's findings were clearly erroneous" because "[h]e was there" and "[w]e
were not"); Stewart, 762 F.2d at 200 (taking restrictive view of what constitutes irreparable
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No one doubts that extensive discrimination still exists within
American society. The recent restrictive Supreme Court case law
raises the question whether individual civil rights plaintiffs acting
as private attorneys general2 14 will be able to engage in enough successful federal litigation to have some impact on the problem. As
this Article illustrates, the Second Circuit also plays an important
role in determining whether cases that might have significant societal impact get past the courthouse door.

harm).

..
4 See supra notes 24-25, 136 and accompanying text (private attorneys general).

